Bahçeli’s Kurdish opening and Türkiye’s new security paradigm

In the autumn of 2024, a development that broke with convention shook Turkish politics. Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) chairman Devlet Bahçeli — a figure long identified with hardline security policy — put himself at the center of Türkiye’s agenda through a new political move that came to be known in public opinion as the “Kurdish opening.” But this opening was not merely a search for domestic peace; it was a strategic defensive move developed from within against the deep threats Türkiye faces in foreign policy.

Bahçeli’s call for PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to “dissolve the organization,” made in his 22 October 2024 group speech, showed that a new page had opened in Türkiye’s fight against terrorism. His statement “we are embracing our Kurdish brothers and sisters” was a sign not of an ethnically based solution but of building national unity on the basis of equal citizenship. The sentence “the Republic of Türkiye has no Kurdish problem” demonstrated that this new political language was aimed not at clashing with the Republic’s founding principles but at making them functional again.

But the timing of this opening makes it a matter not only of domestic politics but also of regional geopolitics. The Hamas-Israel war that began on 7 October 2023 dragged not only Palestinian territory but the entire Middle East into a new spiral of proxy wars. The more than 200 Israeli air strikes on Iran-backed elements in Syria throughout 2024 (SOHR, 2024) constitute a direct threat to Türkiye’s border security. In particular, open American and Israeli support for the YPG presence bordering Türkiye in northern Syria forced Ankara out of a defensive posture and into developing deterrent reflexes.

At this point, the new relational language Türkiye has built with its Kurdish citizens is also a tool for building a domestic national immunity system against outside intervention. Türkiye is no longer reading the Kurdish issue through the lens of domestic peace, but directly as a national-security matter. While daily production of 100,000 barrels of oil (Energy Intelligence, 2024) in US-backed YPG-controlled areas grants these structures economic and military autonomy, Türkiye aims to prevent regional fracture by keeping Kurdish society under the state’s roof.

Yet the truly striking development is the rapidly escalating tension between Türkiye and Israel. Bahçeli’s move should also be read as preparation for possible conflict along this axis. It is clear that Türkiye has begun pursuing a strategy toward Israel that hardens not only at the level of rhetoric, but economically and militarily as well. Between 2023-2024, Türkiye’s defense spending rose 30% to reach $52 billion (SIPRI, 2024). In the same period, Türkiye-Israel trade fell by 50% according to TurkStat data. These figures point not merely to diplomatic strain but to the emergence of grounds for open confrontation.

Ankara’s recent messages of increased intelligence and security cooperation with Iran also show Türkiye shifting toward a new axis in the region. Israeli strikes on Iran-backed elements coming so close to the Turkish border make a hot-conflict scenario increasingly likely not only in Syria specifically but in the Eastern Mediterranean and northern Iraq as well. This shows Türkiye moving away from classic diplomatic-balancing politics and toward a multi-pronged military-preparation and domestic-security-consolidation strategy.

Bahçeli’s opening is positioned precisely within this critical equation: the military superiority achieved against the PKK is now being carried into domestic politics. Although the call made through Öcalan targets a symbolic space, it is essentially being carried out as a process in which the state has taken the initiative. The organization’s leadership in Kandil having evolved into a more radical and independent line shows that the solution will be sought directly in ties built with the public.

In the end, Türkiye has launched this process not only to minimize the terrorist threat at home, but also to re-consolidate its home front against possible geopolitical interventions from abroad. Because the picture Türkiye faces is now far more complex: US-backed Kurdish structures in Syria, Israel’s expanding proxy war against Iran, hardening Israel-Türkiye tension, and a growing likelihood of direct confrontation. This threat map makes it necessary for the state to reconsolidate its internal structure.

In conclusion, Bahçeli’s Kurdish opening is not, in the classic sense, an ethnic reconciliation, but a comprehensive strategic move aimed at rebuilding Türkiye’s national security from within. This strategy aims both to neutralize separatist structures such as the PKK and to thwart attempts by outside powers to encircle Türkiye through the Kurdish card. Success will depend on the trust relationship the process builds with the public, on transparency, and on the state’s will. But this much is clear: this opening is a multi-layered security reform that strengthens not only Türkiye’s domestic peace but its external defense capacity as well.

This is no longer a “resolution process” — it is a “process of national survival.”

This article was first published on 4 May 2026 in Bursa Hakimiyet.