The leadership vacuum and Türkiye’s strategic position in the Islamic world

With a population of roughly two billion, vast energy resources and an ancient civilizational heritage, the Islamic world in theory has every element needed to be an influential global actor. Yet for decades this potential has remained idle for lack of political unity, institutional resilience and a shared vision. Sectarian divisions, state structures open to outside intervention, and structural fragilities limit the Islamic world’s capacity for collective action. Today this deficiency shows itself as visible fragmentation not only in political leadership but in science, education, media and defense as well.

At the center of this multi-layered crisis lies the problem of political representation. Since the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the Islamic world has lacked leadership in both a symbolic and a functional sense. Because Iran’s foreign policy is bounded by ideological lines, it cannot build regional consensus. Saudi Arabia projects a reformist image in recent years but has not fully broken from its traditional status-quo approach. Egypt, meanwhile, has largely lost its regional influence amid domestic political instability and economic bottlenecks. Institutions such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), meanwhile, remain far from filling this vacuum; the failure to reach clear positions in moments of crisis weakens the legitimacy of such structures.

Within this picture, the actor that stands out is Türkiye. With both its historical heritage and the proactive foreign policy it has pursued in recent years, Türkiye is increasingly becoming the center of rising interest and expectation across the Islamic world. The foreign policy pursued under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has not only redefined relations with the West; it has also carried Türkiye into the position of an actor with “representative” power across a belt stretching from Africa to South Asia, from the Balkans to the Middle East.

Diplomatic initiatives pursued at the United Nations level on the Palestinian issue, and the humanitarian sensitivity Türkiye has shown in crisis zones such as Arakan, East Turkestan and Somalia, position Türkiye in international public opinion not merely as a state but as a representative of “conscience.” By the end of 2024, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) had opened 11 new development offices in Africa alone; total aid volume exceeded $1.2 billion. This makes Türkiye the third-largest provider of humanitarian aid on the continent after China and the US.

The defense industry is another area where Türkiye is reinforcing its strategic credibility. Domestically developed defense technologies from companies such as Baykar, ASELSAN and Roketsan have not only strengthened domestic security capacity; through military cooperation established with countries such as Qatar, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkmenistan, they have also made Türkiye a key player in the regional security architecture. According to first-quarter 2025 data from the Presidency of Defense Industries, Türkiye’s defense exports reached $6.3 billion, breaking the all-time record.

Economic indicators support this diplomatic and strategic rise as well. According to the IMF’s April 2025 World Economic Outlook report, Türkiye’s 2024 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached $1.24 trillion. This makes Türkiye, alongside Saudi Arabia ($1.33 trillion) and Indonesia ($1.51 trillion), one of the three largest economies in the Islamic world. With the opening of Istanbul Finance Center, relations built with Gulf capital have deepened; by the end of 2024, investment directed to Türkiye by UAE-based funds alone reached $9.6 billion.

Soft-power elements are also at a level that cannot be ignored. Under the Türkiye Scholarships program, 19,000 students from 180 countries received their education in Türkiye in 2024. The large majority of these students come from Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. In addition, Arabic, French, Swahili and Urdu content from TRT World, TRT Arabi and Anadolu Agency is expanding Türkiye’s media influence on a global scale. According to a 2025 report by Arab social-media analysis platform SocialPalestine, Türkiye ranks as the most-followed foreign country among young users in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

All these developments turn Türkiye into more than a national actor pursuing its own interests alone; they are turning it into a candidate for leadership carrying a claim to “collective representation” in the Islamic world. In the words of Tunisian political scientist Dr. Hichem Marzouki: “Türkiye is turning the idea of the ummah from a romantic ideology into a strategic capacity.”

But this rise is not without its challenges. Türkiye still grapples with domestic problems such as high inflation, income-distribution inequality and political polarization. The geopolitical risks that come with becoming involved in the spheres of influence of great powers such as the US, Russia and China also make it necessary for Ankara to pursue a careful balancing policy. Instability in the Middle East, developments in Gaza, and the dynamics of Iran-Saudi rivalry can also narrow Türkiye’s room for maneuver from time to time.

Even so, Türkiye’s historical experience of statehood, institutional capacity, military strength and cultural capital support the will to overcome these challenges. The issue is no longer merely “being strong,” but how that strength is used. Two paths lie ahead of Türkiye: it will either remain a power of limited influence on a regional scale, or become the bearer of a new vision that makes coordination, representation and strategic solidarity possible across the Islamic world.

At this point, the matter is no longer a possibility; it is a matter of managing a probability backed by data on the ground.

This article was first published on 19 April 2026 in Bursa Hakimiyet.