The triangle’s center of gravity: the Pakistan-Türkiye-Saudi Arabia axis

Turning points in history are rarely written by a single summit photograph; more often they are written when several seemingly independent moves converge on the same axis.

Reading the rapprochement taking shape among Ankara, Islamabad and Riyadh merely as an increase in diplomatic contacts misses the broader strategic picture emerging from it. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence, Saudi Arabia’s financial capacity and Türkiye’s fast-growing defense industry stand out as complementary elements. If this trio turns into an institutional partnership, it could produce a strong candidate for the common strategic center of gravity the Islamic world has long sought — though it is still too early to say this potential will automatically turn into a geopolitical axis.

What stands out about this rapprochement is that the parties bring not similar but complementary capacities to the table. Pakistan brings deterrence, Saudi Arabia financial and religious weight, and Türkiye a different kind of power altogether, with production capability spanning drones to guided munitions. Yet the three countries’ foreign-policy priorities do not always align; economic fragilities and regional rivalries are among the factors that could make institutionalizing this cooperation difficult.

For Türkiye, this equation is not just about greater diplomatic visibility. Ankara is becoming not merely a mediator but an actor that generates demand and gains bargaining power through the technology it produces. Defense exports pave the way for joint production and technology sharing, while Gulf capital flowing into Türkiye could offer meaningful support against the chronic current-account deficit — provided one remembers that sustainable growth also depends on structural reforms. The third dimension is diplomatic: in the leadership vacuum within the Islamic world, Türkiye is becoming a more visible actor, though that alone does not amount to leadership.

One actor that must not be overlooked in this picture is Iran. Even though Tehran has normalized relations with Saudi Arabia, it continues to compete with Riyadh in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and occasionally diverges from Türkiye over Syria and the Caucasus. So while the Ankara-Riyadh-Islamabad axis is not a direct threat from Iran’s standpoint, it is viewed as a new balance of power to be watched closely.

International readings of this also differ. For Washington the picture is complicated: Saudi Arabia’s diversification of options reduces US weight, yet Türkiye’s NATO membership makes it hard to read this simply as an anti-American bloc. For India, Pakistan’s military capacity meeting Turkish technology and Saudi capital is a direct security concern, pushing New Delhi to deepen defense cooperation with France, the US and Israel. Russia views the diversification of Western influence somewhat favorably but does not fully trust Ankara; for China the priority is largely economic — stability along the Belt and Road corridor provides fertile ground for Beijing’s energy and infrastructure investments.

For Türkiye, the opportunities that stand out are: durable defense partnerships, long-term capital flows, diplomatic bargaining power, and a strengthened role as an energy-logistics corridor. But the risks are real too: counterbalancing led by an India-Israel axis, Iran’s rising security anxiety, great-power rivalry narrowing the room for maneuver, and the possibility that each party’s own domestic troubles could derail long-term projects.

The Pakistan-Türkiye-Saudi Arabia axis is among the most concrete approaches yet to the common center of gravity the Islamic world has sought for decades in summit communiqués without ever bringing it down to earth. But such triangles historically end in one of two ways: either they turn into a lasting architecture, or they become a dusty agreement gathering dust the moment the next crisis hits and everyone looks out for themselves. What will decide which path this takes will not be summit photographs, but the moment tension rises with Iran, India makes a new move, or one party’s domestic politics is shaken — that is when this axis will truly be tested. Ankara holds a strong hand today; the question is knowing when and how to bring that hand to the table.

This article was first published on 8 August 2026 in Bursa Hakimiyet.