The “middle power delusion” in great-power competition and Türkiye’s geostrategic exception

One of the most heated debates in the discipline of international relations concerns the capacity of “middle powers” to shape the global system amid deepening US-China rivalry. This critical approach, conceptualized in prestigious outlets such as Foreign Affairs as the “Middle Power Delusion,” argues that the belief held by actors like India, Brazil and Türkiye that they can dictate their own rules in a multipolar order is an illusion. This Western-centered reading claims that the tactical gains such countries achieve by playing great powers off against each other will not grant them lasting strategic immunity. But applying this theoretical framework to Türkiye specifically with mere Western skepticism means overlooking the asymmetric threat environment and geopolitical imperatives Ankara actually faces.

Türkiye’s transition from being positioned as a passive “southeastern flank” of NATO during the Cold War to building its own strategic axis as a “central country” in the twenty-first century is not merely a diplomatic caprice but an ontological security reflex. The inconsistencies displayed by Western allies particularly during the Syrian crisis, and the disregard for Türkiye’s legitimate security concerns, have forced Ankara into a search for strategic autonomy. In this context, the complex interdependence Türkiye has built with Russia, the drone (UAV/UCAV) doctrine that has been a game-changer from the Caucasus to Africa, and the Grain Corridor mediation it undertook in the Ukraine war, are institutional and deep moves that cannot simply be read as “opportunism.” Many of the military and diplomatic interventions Western literature has labeled “spoiler” behavior (Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, Karabakh) are in fact the result of Türkiye taking the initiative to build a new and rational balance in crisis areas where the international community has failed to produce solutions. Unlike many so-called middle powers, Türkiye is an exceptional actor that has proven its power-projection capacity on the ground.

That said, for Türkiye to preserve this exceptional position, it must also filter the legitimate warnings embedded in the “middle power delusion” thesis through a realistic lens. In international relations, the ultimate limit of hard power and diplomatic maneuvering capacity is the resilience of the national economy. In the new geo-economic era shaped by AI, supply chains and technology wars, a structure whose macroeconomic stability is not yet fully secured and which still needs external financing and technology transfer faces structural difficulties in acting as a “fully independent pole.” When the limits of transactional diplomacy are pushed too far, the costs that emerge — such as being excluded from fifth-generation fighter jet programs over air-defense procurement choices — have shown how ruthlessly the system can work in favor of great powers. The multidimensional game Türkiye has built on the global chessboard carries a risk of becoming fragile unless it is backed by its own economic and technological infrastructure.

Taken together, all these geopolitical and structural dynamics show that Türkiye’s effort to integrate into a multipolar world is not a “delusion” or illusion but an unpostponable geopolitical reality. Yet the sustainability of that reality is possible not through a romantic discourse of “breaking from the West,” but through a rational multi-alignment strategy. Türkiye’s greatest asymmetric advantage is preserving its bargaining power within Western institutions (NATO, the Customs Union) while deepening relations with Asia and the Global South. When Ankara’s independent course is crowned with a realism that is aware of its own specific weight, correctly gauges its capacity, and sustains a stabilizing role in the crises of the international system, Türkiye will go far beyond being any middle power and continue to be the undisputed and indispensable playmaker of its own geography.

This article was first published on 31 May 2026 in Bursa Hakimiyet.